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Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language. Edited by JUSSI HAUKIOJA. (London and New 
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. Pp. 204. Price $112.00.) 
 
This review is published in Philosophical Quarterly 66(265), pp. 879–882 (2016). Available online at 
doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv102 . 
 
The study of human language is, in large part, an empirical enterprise. So it is no surprise that 
philosophers of language are becoming increasingly interested in experimental data and the methods 
used to obtain those data. This has led to rapid growth in the literature on experimental philosophy of 
language, out of which two broad research programmes can be distinguished. The positive programme 
involves the collection and use of experimental data to help formulate and support various semantic 
and pragmatic hypotheses. The negative programme involves the collection and use of experimental 
data to undermine the more traditional armchair methodologies for theorising about language and, in 
particular, reference. In mainstream philosophy of language, the negative programme has attracted 
more attention than the positive. 
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language (henceforth Advances) collects together 
eight new papers, along with a brief introduction. While all of the individual papers are high quality 
contributions to the field, as a collection they accomplish something more interesting. Together, they 
indicate that the literature in experimental philosophy of language is undergoing a shift in focus away 
from the negative programme and towards the positive programme. 
For example, Michael Devitt’s previous work in the area has principally engaged with the 
negative programme. In his contribution to Advances, he draws out his case that theories of reference 
should be experimentally tested using elicited production, and proceeds to outline his own attempt 
(with Wesley Buckwalter and Kate Devitt) to perform such tests. Devitt takes these attempts to be 
unsuccessful—due to difficulties in determining whether participants were using certain words with 
their ordinary meanings or in ‘implicit scare quotes’—, so he closes by urging that ‘[w]e need 
experiments to control for this worry’ (p. 55). 
Similarly, Daniel Cohnitz has previously focused largely on the negative programme. And, in 
his contribution to Advances, he likewise uses his earlier work to motivate a foray into the positive 
programme. In contrast to Devitt, however, Cohnitz does not conduct any experiments of his own. 
Rather, he provides examples of eye-tracking experiments from the psycholinguistic literature that, he 
claims, avoid certain methodological problems that he associates with surveys of intuitions—viz. that 
surveys fail to indicate both whether participants are reporting semantic interpretations or ‘lay-
theories of reference’ (p. 100), and whether participants are reporting speaker reference or semantic 
reference. Cohnitz urges philosophers of language to use such techniques to obtain the ‘raw data’ (p. 
104) relevant to theories of reference. 
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Sören Häggqvist and Åsa Wikforss critically discuss the negative programme with regard to 
the reference of proper names, before turning to natural kind terms. They argue that Putnam’s and 
Kripke’s thought experiments do not suffice to establish a Millian account of natural kind terms, 
urging that empirical evidence is required. They then discuss experimental data from the literature, as 
well as data from the history of science, arguing that the data in fact suggest a cluster theory for 
natural kind terms.  
Other contributions to Advances build upon the relevant author’s previous work in the 
positive programme. Ángel Pinillos discusses experiments concerning natural kind terms that he, 
Shaun Nichols and Ron Mallon have reported elsewhere, and then extends the experiments to cover 
proper names. In particular, Pinillos presents new experimental data that, he claims, supports the view 
that proper names are ambiguous between a descriptivist reading and a causal-historical reading. 
Mark Phelan examines transparent ascriptions, sentences such as ‘I believe that your keys are 
in the car’. Transparent ascriptions are often used to report a psychological state, but in other contexts 
are used to convey something about the world—such as when I utter the above ascription while you 
are looking for your keys. Phelan considers two explanations of this context-shiftiness, one that 
appeals to Gricean mechanisms and the other, the direct expression view, according to which ‘I 
believe that’ and cognate expressions serve, in some contexts, only as a hedge. (In such a context, an 
assertion of ‘I believe that your keys are in the car’ is true if, and only if, your keys are in the car.) 
Phelan reports new experimental data from three experiments that favour the direct expression view 
over the Gricean view. 
Even the more critical papers in Advances display a certain sympathy for the positive 
programme. Consider Genoveva Martí’s contribution, which is critical of experimental work on 
general and natural kind terms. Martí focuses on one of the studies discussed by Häggqvist and 
Wikforss, and the study by Nichols, Pinillos and Mallon discussed in Pinillos’s paper; she denies that 
either study presents a problem for Kripke’s causal-historical picture of reference. However, Martí 
clearly accepts (p. 167) that the studies plausibly present the kind of data that can underpin semantic 
theorising. 
Similarly, Max Deutsch defends his earlier view that, contrary to what most participants in 
the debate think (and, in particular, what Devitt thinks), Kripke’s famous arguments in Naming and 
Necessity do not rely on intuitions. He closes, however, by admitting that some experimental work 
does ‘shed light on issues in first-order philosophy of language’ (p. 25)—just not experimental work 
that ‘involves surveying intuitions’. 
It is only Edouard Machery’s contribution that does not engage with the positive programme. 
First, Machery outlines his (and others’) earlier data for demographic variation in folk semantic 
intuitions and considers the response that the folk are confused about the concept of reference. He 
provides a ‘Rylean’ argument that, if the folk are indeed confused, then it is unclear why theorists 
should accept that proper names refer and predicates have extensions. 
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There is one respect in which Advances disappoints: despite ample opportunity, there is no 
engagement between the papers. Here are three examples. First, Devitt says that he has ‘no idea’ how 
eye-tracking and other psycholinguistic studies could be used to test theories of reference (p. 58n21), 
while Cohnitz provides two in depth examples. The reader is left wondering whether Devitt would be 
happy with Cohnitz’s examples, or whether he sees deeper, underlying worries.  
Second, Martí discusses two studies in the literature, arguing that they are compatible with a 
Kripkean causal-historical picture of reference. However, one of those studies is used by Häggqvist 
and Wikforss to tentatively support a cluster theory of reference, and the other is taken by Pinillos to 
support an ambiguity theory. Without engagement between the papers, it is neither clear whether the 
authors disagree with each other nor what, if they do disagree, the key points of tension are.  
Third, Deutsch criticises the common assumption that the standard methodology in the 
philosophy of language involves using intuitions as evidence, highlighting Devitt as a main offender. 
Yet Devitt baldly states that the standard methodology ‘simply tests theories of reference against 
philosophers’ referential intuitions’ (p. 31), and other contributions largely assume the same. The 
reader would benefit from a critical discussion of Deutsch’s contribution somewhere in the collection.  
Overall, Advances is a welcome addition to an already thriving literature. As the papers 
largely build upon work published elsewhere, it is perhaps not the best option as an introduction to the 
literature nor as the basis of a graduate class. Regardless, anyone with a research interest in 
experimental philosophy of language should read it—if only to see how theorists are increasingly 
thinking about the importance of the positive programme in experimental philosophy of language. 
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